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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 
























































































































































































This paper begins by summarising the constitutional aspects of 
Ireland's accession to the existing European Community Treaties, 
insofar as they have implications for Ireland's ratification of 
the proposed Treaty setting up the European Union. It then 
considers how far the Treaty setting up the Union may be in­
consistent with the Constitution of Ireland as it is at present, 
and how the inconsistency should be resolved. It describes the 
procedures, under the Irish Constitution, for amending the 
Constitution, and for ratifying a treaty such as the Treaty 
setting up the Union. Lastly, it assesses the elements likely to 
influence public opinion in Ireland at the various stages of 
these procedures.
PART I
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF IRELAND'S ACCESSION TO THE EXISTING 
TREATIES
Before Ireland's accession to the three existing European 
Community Treaties, it was clear that the powers of the Community 
institutions were incompatible with the provisions of the Con­
stitution of Ireland of 1937 dealing with legislative, executive 
and judicial powers (1).
Briefly, these provided that the sole power of making laws for 
the State belonged to the Oireachtas (the President and the two 
Houses), although subordinate legislatures were permitted.
Justice was to be administered only by judges apppinted as 
provided by the Constitution, and the Supreme Court was to be the 
court of final appeal. Judges were to be appointed by the 
President. The executive powers of the State, including those in 
connection with external relations, were to be exercised only by 
or on the authority of the government which was to be responsible 




























































































that only the bodies established by the Constitution could 
exercise governmental powers, to exclude any remnant of British 
imperial power. The effect was to exclude also the possibility of 
transferring any such powers to any international body such as 
the Community (no such body existed, of course, in 1937). The 
measures to grant the Community appropriate powers in Irish law 
constituted a transfer of powers and could not have been re­
garded, under Irish Constitutional law, as a permissible dele­
gation of powers (2). The reasons why the 1937 Constitution was 
incompatible with the Community Treaties are also applicable to 
the proposed European Union Treaty.
To make it possible for the Republic of Ireland to ratify the 
Community Treaties in 1972, some amendment to the Constitution 
was necessary. Instead of a series of amendments altering each 
Article of the Constitution thought to be inconsistent with the 
Treaties , a single amendment was adopted by the Oireachtas and 
approved by a large (83 %) majority of the people in the 1972 
referendum. The amendment, in the form of an.addition to Article 
29 of the Constitution (on international relations) provides :
" The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (established by Treaty signed at Paris on the 18th 
day of April 1951), the European Economic Community (es­
tablished by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March 
1957) and the European Atomic Energy Community (established 
by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March 1957). No 
provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, 
acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by 
the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents 
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Com­
munities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of 




























































































Several points must be made. First, the provision is limited to 
the existing three Communities, as established by treaties 
specifically mentioned. It would not therefore apply to a wholly 
new community, though it might apply to the existing Communities 
if they came to be based on new treaties. The amendment is there­
fore narrower than the corresponding provisions of the consti­
tutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and (perhaps surprisingly) Norway (3),.
Second, the amendment wisely avoids listing the Articles of the 
Constitution which are, or might be thought to be, inconsistent 
with the powers of the institutions of the existing Communities. 
This means that no clarification or development of those powers 
under the Treaties could give rise to difficulties merely because 
the draftsman had failed to foresee its future incompatibility 
with the Constitution. For example, it is now clear that the 
Community's powers in the areas of commercial policy (4) and 
fisheries (5) and in the expanding areas dealt with by Community 
legislation which come within Community competence under the 
principle stated in the AETR judgment, (6) are all exclusive 
powers, and that no corresponding powers remain with Member 
States . The exclusive nature of these powers was less clear in 
1972 than it is today. This is important because omission of any 
list of constitutional provisions affected made it possible to 
avoid having to decide whether the Treaties were, or might 
through the development of Community law become, inconsistent 
with Article 5 of the Constitution : "Ireland is a sovereign, 
independent, democratic state". A State which has no powers in 
the fields of commercial policy, fisheries, or a variety of other 
spheres on which the Community of which it is a member has 
legislated is obviously less sovereign, if the phrase is per­
missible, than one which still retains powers in those spheres. 
Any list of the Articles of the Constitution and the Treaty 
provisions which might prove incompatible with them would also 
have to make some provision to cover the unforeseeable develop­
ments under Article 235, EEC Treaty. A general, all-purpose 





























































































The wording of the amendment was narrow in another respect, which
has given rise to doubt and some practical difficulty. It 
authorises Irish legislation which would, but for the amendment, 
be incompatible with the Constitution only if the legislation is 
"necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Commu­
nities". The question has arisen whether the Convention on a 
European Community Patent (7) was a measure ratification of which 
was "necessitated by the obligations of membership". Although 
negotiated under Community auspices, it is a convention, not a 
regulation or a directive. Some Irish lawyers have therefore 
doubted whether ratification is obligatory for Member States 
under Community law, even in spite of the Council Declaration (8) 
which says that it is obligatory. These doubts are due to a 
narrow and, in the present writer's view, incorrect interpre­
tation of Article 5 EEC Treaty, rather than to a particular 
interpretation of the amendment to the Irish Constitution. 
Clearly, the question whether Member States have an obligation to 
ratify the convention is ultimately a question of' Community law, 
not a question of Irish Constitutional law. It seems highly 
unlikely that the Court of Justice, which has interpreted Article 
5 widely (9) on a number of accasions, would rule that rati­
fication was not legally necessary. However, even if that is 
correct, it does not follow that ratification of all conventions 
drafted under Community auspices, in some sense, is obligatory 
for Member States under Community law : the European Monetary 





























































































THE TREATY SETTING UP THE EUROPEAN UNION
The first question that arises is whether the Treaty setting up 
the European Union (herein called "the Union Treaty") would be 
covered by the 1972 amendment to the Constitution of Ireland. If 
it was, no further constitutional amendment would be necessary. 
However, it seems clear that the Union Treaty could not be 
thought of as a mere amendment of the three existing Community 
Treaties, or as merely reconstituting the existing Communities 
under a new name. Any such interpretation is excluded by the 
broad scope of the new Treaty : by Article 1, which speaks of 
setting up the European Union ; by Article 6, on the legal 
personality of the Union, which would be unnecessary if the Union 
was merely taking over the legal status of the existing Com­
munities ; by Article 7, on the "acquis communautaire" ; by 
Article 82, which provides for the possibility that not all of 
the Member States of the existing Communities may initially 
ratify the new Treaty ; and by the broader explicit scope of the 
new Treaty.
If the 1972 amendment to the Irish Constitution does not cover 
the new Treaty, the next question is whether the provisions of 
the new Treaty are compatible with the rest of the Constitution. 
It is clear that they are not, for reasons essentially similar to 
the reasons which made an amendment to the Constitution essential 
in 1972.
The new Treaty provides (Article 36) that the legislative powers 
of the Union are exercisable by the Parliament and the Council, 
acting essentially on the initiative of the Commission. Under 
Article 42, the law of the Union is directly applicable in Member 
States, and prevails over national law. In addition, the 
Commission would have implementing legislative powers (Article 
40). These Articles are not compatible with Article 15 of the 
Irish Constitution which (subject to the amendment to Article 29 




























































































institutions) says that the exclusive power of making laws for 
the State is vested in the Oireachtas (the President and the two 
Houses of the legislature).
Under the new Treaty powers which are classified as executive by 
the Irish Constitution would be exercised by the Council and the 
Commission. Article 21 says that the Council would exercise 
powers in the field of international relations : whatever powers 
exactly might be conferred on the Council, they would include 
powers of the kind now exercised by the Community institutions, 
which in Ireland are exercisable (except insofar as the Community 
is concerned) only by the Government, under Article 29 of the 
Constitution. The powers of the Commission are to be laid down by 
the basic law (loi organique) on that institution, but in the 
meantime it would have the same structure and operation as the 
Commission of the Communities whose executive powers, as already 
mentioned, would be inconsistent with the Constitution of Ireland 
if it were not for the 1972 amendment. Specifically, Article 28 
of the new Treaty says the Commission would adopt implementing 
regulations and take the necessary executive decisions to put 
Union laws into operation, would carry out the budget, represent 
the Union in external relations, and supervise the application of 
the new Treaty and the laws of the Union. These powers, however 
they might be subsequently defined, could not be reconciled with 
the Irish Constitution. Nor would it be possible for Ireland to 
ratify the new Treaty in the hope of being able to ensure 
subsequently that the basic laws governing the powers of the 
institutions of the Union were so drafted as to be consistent 
with the Constitution as it stands.
The Constitution of Ireland classifies governmental powers as 
"legislative, executive and judicial" (10). Monetary powers, if 
they had to be fitted into this classification, would be "exe­
cutive" powers. Monetary powers therefore may be exercised only 
by or on the authority of the Irish Government, unless their 
exercise is authorised by either the existing provision dealing 




























































































the European Union. However, no express mention of 
monetary powers would be needed in the new Irish constitutional 
provision dealing with the European Union, if it is drafted 
broadly enough.
The new Treaty says very little about judicial powers. Article 30 
provides briefly that the Court is to ensure that the law is 
observed in the interpretation and application of the new Treaty, 
and of all acts adopted under it. It provides briefly for 
appointment of judges by the Parliament and the Council, and says 
that other matters are to be dealt with by a basic law (loi 
organique). Article 43 provides for judicial control, on the 
lines of existing Community law, and completed by a basic law. 
This basic law would extend the rights of individuals to 
challenge legal acts adopted by the Union, give the Court express 
jurisdiction in fundamental rights cases involving the Union, and 
jurisdiction in a "procédure préjudicielle" i.e. by reference or 
case stated from national courts. The Court would have power to 
review the failure of national courts to refer questions of Union 
law to it, and to "sanction" the failure of Member States to 
fulfil their obligations. All this would involve a very sub­
stantial increase in the jurisdiction (and the volume of work) of 
the Court. The Court's overall powers, therefore, however exactly 
they might later be defined, would be incompatible with the 
Articles of the Constitution of Ireland on the administration of 
justice by judges appointed by the President of Ireland, unless 
authorised by a new constitutional provision.
Some other comments may be useful.
First, the scope of the activities of the Union, as expressly 
envisaged, is wider than those provided for by the existing 
Treaties. The new Treaty refers explicitly to citizenship (Art.
3) of the Union, fundamental rights (Art. 4), the power of 
enquiry of the Parliament (Art. 18), sanctions on Member States 
(Arts. 43, 44), international crime (Art. 46), credit policy and 




























































































communications, research, and energy (Art. 53), health, con­
sumers, regions, the environment, education and culture, and in­
formation (Arts. 56-62, passim). It is more explicit about 
international relations than the existing Treaties (Arts. 9, 
63-69). It is true that much of this is little more than the 
existing Communities are already doing, but express provisions 
must inevitably result in wider and increased powers. More 
directly relevant to the subject of this paper, Art. 68 provides 
that the Council may enlarge the field of cooperation to cover 
armaments, arms sales to third countries, defence policy, and 
disarmament, and may transfer a sphere from the area of coo­
peration between Member States to the field of common i.e. Union, 
action. Less controversially, the Union is to supervise the 
consistency of the international policies of Member States (Art. 
67) and is to use its influence to promote peaceful settlement of 
conflicts, security, discouragement of aggression, détente, and 
mutual reduction of military forces and arms on a balanced and 
controlled basis (Art. 63). These are objectives, not powers, but 
they make it obvious that the scope of the activities of the 
Union would not be limited to the economic and social spheres, as 
a reading of the existing Treaties would suggest was the initial 
scope of the existing Communities.
In drafting a new amendment to the Constitution of Ireland to 
allow ratification of the new Treaty, the Irish Government will 
have to decide whether to limit it to the European Union, based 
on the new Treaty, or to make it a broader amendment permitting 
the 'Oireachtas to ratify any international agreement giving 
powers to international institutions, on the lines of the pro­
visions of the German, Italian, Luxemburg, Dutch and Norwegian 
Constitutions. It is not clear whether, if the Irish people are 
willing to approve by referendum an amendment permitting Ireland 
to ratify the Treaty setting up the European Union, they would be 
significantly less willing to vote for a more general amendment. 
Such opposition as there will be to an amendment'concerned only 
with the new Treaty might not be significantly stronger if the 



























































































Whether the future amendment to the Constitution is drafted to 
cover only the European Union, or to cover any international or 
any European institutions, it is clear that, for the same reasons 
as in 1972, it must be a single amendment in general words, not a 
list of Constitutional provisions being modified. If that is 
accepted, it follows that it is not necessary to.go through the 
new Treaty in detail comparing it with the Constitution of 
Ireland. Nor is it necessary to discuss how far the clauses of 
the new Treaty dealing with the "organs" of the Union might come 
into conflict with the Constitution, in the future. A problem 
which did not arise in 1972 concerns the European Monetary Fund 
which, under Art. 33.4, has the independence necessary to 
guarantee monetary stability. This phrase glosses over the very 
difficult problem of the degree of independence needed to carry 
out (let alone to guarantee) such an objective. However, whatever 
the future powers of the Fund may be, they could be made con­
sistent with the Irish Constitution by a single amendment in 
sufficiently general words which in any case is appropriate for 
other reasons.
The question of the "organs" of the European Union, and the 
question of the European Community Patent Convention, discussed 
above, imply that the new amendment to the Irish Constitution 
should be worded broadly enough to cover new organs and arran­
gements not expressly contemplated by the new Treaty and not 
based on legislative measures adopted by the Union. Irish 
Governments will want to ensure that difficulties such as that 
which arose over the Community Patent Convention do not arise 
again. They are perhaps not likely to do so (the proposed 
Community trademark measures, for example, is to-be a Regulation 
and not a convention), but it is desirable both for Ireland and 
for the Community and the future Union, that the problem should 
be dealt with. A constitutional amendment which would solve this 




























































































The State may become a member of the European Union to be 
established in accordance with the Treaty signed at - on - . 
No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, 
acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by 
obligations undertaken under arrangements made by the Union 
or under its auspices, or prevents laws enacted, acts done 
or measures adopted by the Union or under its auspices or by 
institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the 
State.
SOVEREIGNTY
Even if the amendment is in the form of general clause substan­
tially similar to the 1972 the question will be raised, in a 
political if not necessarily in a legal context, whether rati­
fication would be consistent with the "sovereign" status of 
Ireland provided for in Article 5 of the Constitution. Without 
attempting a definition of "sovereignty" or trying to give an 
exhaustive reply to the question, some points may be made (11). 
First, legally Ireland's sovereignty would be limited precisely 
as much as, but no more than, the sovereignty of every other 
Member State of the European Union. Politically, a small State 
with relatively little influence on its own gains more, on 
balance, by having a vote in the Council of the European Union 
than it loses by limiting or giving up certain powers. If, as 
seems likely, Ireland's economic interests would depend on it 
becoming a member of the European Union, then the point should be 
made that a State has more real sovereignty if it is prosperous 
than if it is not.
Second, sovereignty is not a precise concept, and.the new Treaty 
is (even more than the EEC Treaty) a traite-cadre, a consti­
tutional framework, not a static traite-loi . It is not possible 
to say, if the political integration of Europe proceeds on the 
lines envisaged by the new Treaty, at what point in the process 




























































































transfer their sovereignty gradually to the Union, and no one act 
of transfer would be decisive, politically or legally. Having 
said that, however, since the new Treaty contemplates (notably in 
Art. 68) enlargement of the sphere of cooperation and transfer of 
particular fields from cooperation to common action, in areas 
including foreign policy and defence, it would be impossible to 
say that Member States of the Union would still be "sovereign" 
after all the transfers of powers visualised by the new Treaty 
had been fully carried out. The history of federations suggests 
that they do not remain at a stage of partial integration : they 
either progress further, or they separate again.
Sovereignty de facto, as distinct from sovereignty de jure, 
depends on how far economic and political realities allow the 
State concerned to control its own destinies. In the case of a 
small country with a very open economy (i.e. external trade 
represents a very high proportion of GNP) which is heavily 
dependent on foreign capital, control over its economy is 
strictly limited. Ireland's experiment with import-substitution 
lasted from the 1930s until the 1950s, by which time it was 
obvious that its usefulness had ended.
In spite of the "framework" nature of the new Treaty, and its 
reliance on "lois organiques" to fill in even very important 
matters, and in spite of the fact that many of its other pro­
visions state aims and not legal powers, the new Treaty looks 
more like the constitution of a federation, or at least a con­
federation, than the existing Treaties do. This is partly because 
the most conspicious change proposed is the conversion of the 
European Parliament into one chamber (admittedly, with limited 
powers) of a bicameral legislature. It is also because the new 
Treaty speaks explicitly of exclusive and concurrent powers (e.g. 
Arts. 12, 47, 48, 50-53) and of the primacy of Union law (Art. 




























































































powers which would belong exclusively to the Union as soon as the 
Treaty came into force would be no more extensive, at first 
sight, than the exclusive powers of the existing Communities.
Art. 64.2, for example, merely declares the existing law (12). 
Article 32, however, which contemplates the enlargement of the 
competences of the Union, does not (as Article 235 EEC Treaty now 
does) limit the enlargement to cases where it is shown that it is 
"necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the 
Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community".
In spite of this, the new Treaty retains, in Art. 23, a modified 
version of the "Luxembourg compromise", under which, during a 
transitional period of ten years, a Member State may invoke a 
"vital national interest" and, if the Commission recognises that 
the interest in question comes into this category, no vote takes 
place and the matter is reconsidered. This clause preserves a 
significant element of sovereignty, for as long as it is in 
force, although its operation depends on the Commission accepting 
the importance of the matter for the Member State in question.
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Reading the draft European Union Treaty, it is possible to 
imagine that, if the Member States do what the Treaty contem­
plates, they will gradually move along a spectrum, beginning with
*f*the existing situation under Community JLaw, towards a situation 
in which their sovereignty, insofar as it would $till exist, 
would be very limited indeed. The Treaty contemplates the 
transfer, to the Union, of some at least of each of the kinds of 
powers which are transferred to a federation by its member 
states. One cannot now say how many of these powers will in fact 
be transferred, or in what order, or on what conditions. One 
therefore cannot say at what point in the future Member States 
would cease to be "sovereign", even if there was a precise 
concept of sovereignty, which is far from being the case.
There has never previously been, as far as my knowledge extends, 
a treaty between independent States which contemplated transfers 
of governmental powers great enough to establish a federation, 
but which did not at once transfer those powers. Since the extent 
of the powers of members of a federation may vary widely, the key 
question in connection with the issue of sovereignty at first 
sight appears to be at what point the members would cease to be 
full subjects of public international law. But even this question 
is not really a useful one : States which already have no 
treaty-making power in the field of external trade are not fully 
sovereign in the conventional sense. The reality is that the 
concepts of "independence" and "sovereignty" are not appropriate 
to the situation created by the existing Community Treaties, or 
to the Union treaty. Member States would no longer be "sovereign" 
in the normal sense when foreign policy and defence had been 
entirely transferred to the Union, but it seems unlikely that 
even the transfer of these powers, assuming it occurs, would be 
made in one single step. Sovereignty is a bundle of powers, and 
so it is divisible. In the Community it is divided between the 
Member States and the Community itself (13), and the same will be 




























































































If one asks the more practical question : how may a small country 
with an open economy best safeguard its interests in an in­
creasingly interdependent world ? It is obvious that its in­
terests may be better protected by the rights and safeguards for 
member states of a federal or near-federal system than by 
"sovereign" statehood without close ties by treaty or otherwise. 
The important question to ask is how the rights and safeguards 
for the interests of each member state compare with those which 
would be available to it if it was neither a member of, or 
closely associated with, the Community or the Union. For example, 
Ireland, which has not been represented at international "Summit" 
meetings, would have greater influence at those meetings through 
the Community or the Union than it is ever likely to obtain in 
any other way.
BRINGING THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION INTO FORCE IN IRELAND
An amendment to the Constitution of Ireland must,, under Article 
47 of the Constitution, be made by referendum. An amendment is 
approved if a majority of the votes cast at the referendum are in 
favour. There is no requirement that a certain minimum of the 
electorate should have voted. Voting in Ireland is not compul­
sory.
Every proposal for the amendment of the Constitution must be 
initiated in the DAil (Article 46, Constitution). When passed (or 
deemed passed, under Article 23, in the case of disagreement 
between the two Houses) by both Houses of the Oireachtas, it is 
submitted to the electorate by referendum. It is signed by the 
President, and becomes law, only after the referendum has 
approved it.
Private Members' Bills are permitted in the D4il, but they are 
extremely rare, and it is inconceivable that a Bill of such 
importance would be introduced by anyone except the Government. 
Under Article 28 of the Constitution, Ireland has a system of 
cabinet government, in which the government normally has the 




























































































An amendment to the Constitution on the lines of the 1972 ---- - r"
amendment would make it possible for Ireland to join the European 
Union, but would not make Ireland a member. Ratification of the 
new Treaty could take place only after the amendment to the 
Constitution had been signed by the President and so passed into 
law. Ratification of any treaty is an act of the Government under 
Article 28 of the Constitution and no treaty (even one expressly 
mentioned in an amendment to the Constitution) becomes part of 
the domestic law of the Irish State except by an Act of the 
Oireachtas. After the Constitution had been amended, therefore, 
it would be necessary for the new Treaty to be enacted into law 
by an Act similar to the European Communities Act 1972.
In that Act, which is simpler and more direct than the corres­
ponding legislation in the UK, the most important clause is s.2, 
which provides :
From the 1st day of January 1973, the treaties governing the 
European Communities and the existing and future acts of the 
institutions thereof shall be binding on the State and shall 
be part of the domestic law thereof under the conditions 
laid down by these treaties.
This clause, because it embodies a renvoi to Community law, 
ensures that in any case of conflict between Irish law and 
Community law, the latter prevails. It also ensures that Com­
munity measures have, in Irish domestic law, whatever direct 
effects are given to them by Community law, no more and no less.
The amendment to the Constitution of course ensures that Com­
munity measures (and Irish measures necessitated by the obli­
gations of membership) are immune from challenge on constitu­
tional grounds. As between non-constitutional measures of Irish 
domestic law the normal rules apply (Acts prevail.over delegated 
legislation, later legislation prevails over prior legislation 




























































































given to enable e.g. the Government or a Minister to amend an 
Act, even in order to bring it into line with Community law. This 
was done by the 1972 Act, s. 3.
Ratification by Ireland of the new Treaty setting up the European 
Union would be possible only after an Act essentially similar to 
the European Communities Act 1972 had been adopted. (Some 
drafting improvements could be imagined).
The rules of Irish law concerning the supremacy of Community law, 
and the effects of rules of Community law which are not directly 
applicable, would be the same, under the new Treaty, as in the 
case of the Community Treaties (14), unless the constitutional 
amendment or the implementing legislation were differently 
drafted. There is no reason to think that they would be.
The Irish Constitutional rules just stated appear to deal with - 
the question, which might arise, whether the Union had exceeded 
its own powers. If the new provision in the Constitution of 
Ireland corresponds to that already discussed, and if the legis­
lation giving effect to the Union Treaty in Ireland contained a 
clause corresponding to that in the European Communities Act 
1972, a determination by the Community Court that the Union had, 
or had not, exceeded its powers, if that question was raised 
before it, would be binding on the Irish courts. Unless Irish 
public opinion altered greatly, it would be most improbable that 
the provisions would be deliberately drafted so as to make the 
Irish Supreme Court, rather than the Court of Justice, the 
ultimate arbiter of whether, in the view of Irish law, the Union 
had exceeded its powers. The only practical result of drafting 
the provisions in that way would be to make it possible (though 
no doubt it would be unlikely) for the two courts to give con­
flicting decisions on the question, if it ever arose. Irish 
public opinion is not so concerned about the possibility of the 




























































































concerned about the possibility of the Union exceeding its (much 
wider) powers, that the possibility of such a conflict would be 
intentionally created, for the purpose of protecting Irish 
sovereignty or otherwise. As is explained below, Irish public 
opinion is not as sensitive as public opinion in certain other 
Member States about enlargement of the powers of the Community.
For the reasons given below in the socio-political part of this 
paper, it is impossible to imagine a referendum being held to 
allow Ireland to join the Union unless at least one of the 
present two large political parties was in favour. However, once 
the referendum was passed by the people, no further difficulty 
would arise unless a new government came into office which was 
opposed to Ireland joining the Union. Unless this happened,
(which would be unlikely if the referendum had been passed by the 
people), the government which had promoted the referendum would 
be able to ensure that the legislation needed for accession was
jenacted .
NEUTRALITY - NOT A LEGAL QUESTION IN IRELAND
The question of Irish neutrality is discussed belpw, as a po­
litical question. There is nothing in the Constitution of 
Ireland, or in any Irish legislation or Irish law, or in any 
treaty, on the question of Irish neutrality. It has been sugges­
ted that a provision stating Ireland's neutrality should be added 
to the Constitution, but this suggestion seems to have no signi­
ficant public support. Such a provision, if it were seriously 
considered, would necessitate a definition, or would at least 
provoke a discussion, of what is meant by Irish neutrality. A 
provision in the Irish Constitution stating Ireland's neutrality 
would ultimately be incompatible with Ireland's membership of the 
European Union. Once this is understood, and once the long-term 
economic costs of staying out of the Union have been realised, it 
is improbable that any movement to have such a provision added to 




























































































A NEW IRISH CONSTITUTION ?
For completeness, another possibility should be mentioned. It has 
been suggested from time to time that a whole new Constitution 
should be drawn up, and adopted by referendum. This would 
certainly be one possible way of making certain changes in the 
existing Constitution which might not be passed by referendum if 
they were put to the voters separately. If, for any reason, a 
whole new Constitution were drawn up and put to the voters in a 
referendum, the issues concerning Ireland's accession to the 
European Union (assuming that the new Constitution was so drafted 
as to permit accession, which presumably it would be) would be 
combined with the issues, whatever they were, about the relative 
merits of tne new constitution and the existing Constitution.
This in turn would mean that, if the new constitution was 
adopted, the issues concerning accession to the Union would not 
be decided by referendum : Ireland uses referenda only when it is 
necessary to amend the Constitution, or to adopt a new one, and 
not on policy questions, however important. The.decision on 
accession would therefore be made by the legislature. This is not 
the place to discuss the desirability, or otherwise, of ex­
tensively altering the present Constitution. It may simply be 
mentioned that one of the main reasons why the idea has been 
suggested in recent years is that it has been felt that extensive 
changes would be necessary to make the Constitution more
attractive to those people in Northern Ireland who .are opposed to
reunification of Ireland. However, it is obvious that consti­
tutional changes, however extensive, might be a necessary con­
dition but could never be a sufficient condition for reunifi­
cation, and that the other conditions, whatever they may turn out































































































This part of this paper assesses some of the elements which are 
likely to influence public opinion in the’ Republic of Ireland at 
the time of the referendum which would be necessary to enable 
Ireland to ratify the Treaty setting up the European Union.
Ireland is the only Member State of the Community which was a 
colony within living memory. (Legally Ireland was a province of 
the UK between 1800 and 1922, but most Irish people regarded its 
status as substantially that of a colony). National independence 
is therefore not taken for granted as much as in other countries. 
Ireland is also the only Member State in the position of having 
part of what it regards as its national territory under the 
jurisdiction of another Member State. On the other hand, Ireland 
is a small country, and never had an empire. It does not feel 
itself to have, or to have had, a world-wide political influence 
which it would be reluctant to see merged into a European group 
of states, although there is a strong sense of fellow-feeling 
with Irish emigrants outside Europe, notably in the USA. Irish 
people are accustomed to the idea that important decisions affec­
ting their interests are taken outside Ireland, whether in 
London, Washington or Brussels. They are not annoyed, as I feel 
that English people are often annoyed, by the thought of de­
cisions affecting their interests being taken by "foreigners" 
(even when the U.K. has a vote and a veto). Most Irish people are 
not prejudiced against the idea of the existing Community ex­
tending its powers, in the way that many Danes and English people 
are prejudiced against it. The 1972 referendum campaign in Ire­
land did not need to concern itself with reassurance against 
exaggerated or irrational fears. Irish people are not prejudiced 
against foreigners. In the 1972 referendum, no less than 83 % of 
those voting were in favour of joining the Community, a remar­
kably high proportion in a country which did not experience 
invasion during World War II and therefore which is not greatly 





























































































However, there is relatively little interest in the "European 
ideal" in Ireland. Only one leading Irish politician has a 
reputation, in Ireland or elsewhere, as being really "communau­
taire". This is not merely because Ireland is not large enough to 
feel that Europe cannot be built without her, or to feel that she 
has an important responsibility in international relations. It is 
also becauseof the extent to which Irish opinion was preoccupied 
with the problem of Northern Ireland, even before the present 
troubles began there fifteen years ago, in 1969.
For these and other reasons, Ireland has not played a role in the 
Community which has been sufficiently influential and construc­
tive to give Irish public opinion confidence and satisfaction 
comparable to that derived from Ireland's involvement, in the 
less recent past, in the United Nations. This is partly because 
the activities of e.g. Ireland's first two Presidencies (during 
which, inter alia, the first two Lomé Conventions were concluded) 
were too complex and not conspicious enough, .to be widely appre­
ciated in Ireland.
Irish attitudes towards the Community have been primarily 
concerned with economics. Initially the Community was, correctly, 
regarded as likely to benefit Ireland economically in various 
ways, and to a very important extent. More recently, there has 
been a tendency to criticise the Community, somewhat unfairly, 
for its inability to prevent or surmount world recession, in­
creased oil prices, and unemployment in Ireland and elsewhere.
This disillusionment has coincided with the unpleasant effects of 
(very necessary) measures taken to put Irish government finances 
and the national economy in order, and to reduce budget and 
balance-of-payments deficits, overspending, and excessive foreign 
borrowing. Even the very large economic benefits (especially in 
agriculture) which Ireland has unquestionably obtained from 
Community membership have not prevented these difficulties from 
arising, but the difficulties have caused public opinion to 
underestimate the benefits. However, it is important to emphasise 
that in Ireland, unlike some other Member States, dissatisfaction 




























































































the Community or to its aims, and shows no signs of developing 
into opposition to them.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
As already mentioned, the problems of Northern Ireland, and of 
Ireland's relations with the U.K. in the light of Northern 
Ireland problem, have occupied the attention of many Irish people 
who would otherwise have been thinking about Community affairs. 
However, it has been a Northern Ireland politician, John Hume, 
who has done most to involve the Community constructively in N. 
Ireland. Many people in N. Ireland realise that they would get 
greater benefits from the Community if they ware part of the 
Republic of Ireland, or if they could be treated in the same way 
as the Republic. But the Community has not been able to make the 
border between N. Ireland and the Republic wither way.
So far, progress towards European integration is not regarded as 
a way (certainly not an adequate way) of solving N. Ireland's 
difficulties. One of the papers written for the New Ireland Forum
(15) points out that "the structure of agriculture in the North • 
has moved closer to that in the South although the use of MCAs 
has increased the cost and complexity of cross-border trade ... 
membership of the Community has facilitated co-operation on
issues such as cross-border development ... However, in 1979.>
economic cooperation between North and South was inhibited by the 
decision of the UK to stay out of the European Monetary System 
... Membership of the European Community has ... benefited both 
parts of the island but the South, because of its independence, 
has been able to make greater use of it' ... there.would be more 
advantages to the North if a specific agricultural policy could 
be developed rather than one on a UK basis" . Another Forum paper
(16) pointed out that the use made by the Republic of Ireland of 
Community loan instruments, mainly to European Investment Bank, 
has been enormously greater than the use by the North. The New
Ireland Forum paper on the legal systems in Ireland (17) pointed 
out that Community law is likely to be a significant harmonising 




























































































However, the main Report of the Forum says very little about the 
Community, merely mentioning (18) that an integrated economic 
policy for the whole country would be in the interests of both 
parts, since both have common interests in areas such as agri­
culture and regional policy which diverge from the interests of 
Britain .
An improvement in the situation in Northern Ireland would allow 
Irish people to turn more of their attention to Community 
affairs. More important, the more the Community can play a useful 
and constructive role in Northern Ireland, the more favourably 
public opinion in both parts of Ireland will regard it. Northern 
Ireland therefore is both a reason why Irish politicians, with 
the notable exception of John Hume, have given less time than 
they might have given to Community affairs, and is also an 
opportunity for the Community to make a real contribution which 
would not only be worthwhile in itself but would significantly 
increase its popularity in both parts of Ireland, and no doubt in 
Britain as well. Northern Ireland's problems are costing the U.K. 
some one thousand three hundred million pounds sterling each 
year, and though the corresponding cost to the Republic is less 
in absolute terms, it is greater in relation to the size of the 
country's budget. An imaginative and constructive involvement of 
the Community in Northern Ireland would be perfectly possible, if 
the U.K. would agree to it, and would offer a much better hope of 
a real long term solution than anything which anyone has yet 
suggested.
IRISH ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION
European Political Cooperation, though useful, has so far been so 
modest that it is difficult to deduce much from Irish attitudes 
towards it. When, as in the Tindemans Report in 1976, it was 
suggested that defence matters might be included within the 
sphere of political cooperation, or when it was suggested in the 





























































































by the Community, the Irish reaction was negative, but not 
primarily on grounds of principle. In fact Irish politicians have 
seen no difficulty in advocating Irish neutrality and giving at 
least verbal support for European integration. While avoiding 
publicity, successive Irish governments have cooperated prag­
matically in EPC activities so far.
In a speech in the Dail on 22nd October 1981, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Professor Dooge (Fine Gael) said :
" When we acceded to the Community in 1973 the position was 
that we not only accepted the "acquis communautaire" es­
tablished by the various Treaties, we also undertook a
(i
political commitment in the context of progress towards 
European Union, to consult and co-ordinate with our partners 
on foreign policy in the non-Treaty inter-governmental 
framework of European Political Co-operation ... Ireland, in 
common with other Member States, has been quite satisfied 
with the way political co-operation has developed within 
this framework ... Of course, there are some issues where 
positions still diverge and this is how one would expect it 
to be, given the varying interests and traditions of the 
Member States and the essential flexibility and pragmatism 
of the way political co-operation works. Notwithstanding 
such divergences, the experience of all of the Ten, in­
cluding Ireland, has been that to the extent the views of 
the Ten coincide, we have opportunities to play a far more 
significant and influential role and serve our interests 
more effectively on many issues, acting together with our 
partners in the Ten, than we would have as individual States 
acting alone ... the London Report of 13 October 1981 on 
European Political Co-operation ... reiterates the political 
commitment of the Member States to consult on foreign policy 
questions. An important element is the recognition that the 




























































































for further integration, and the maintenance and development
of Community policies in accordance with the Treaties, 
before further steps can be taken to strengthen political 
co-operation ... Political co-operation is concerned with 
co-ordination of foreign policy. Within that context dis­
cussion has taken place from an early stage in political 
co-operation of foreign policy matters that 'have a security 
dimension ... This has not presented a problem for Ire­
land ... it is useful and important that in the London 
Report it is clear that the scope of political co-operation 
on these matters is confined to political aspects of se­
curity and that defence or military issues as such are 
excluded ... The relevant paragraph in the Report, far from 
being an extension of the scope of political co-operation, 
is in fact an explicit re-statement, in a form acceptable to 
Ireland, of the practice established under successive Irish 
governments . . . the Federal German Government recently 
endorsed Mr. Genscher's ideas on establishing a new frame­
work for evolution to European Union ... It is right and 
, appropriate that we should debate those proposals on their 
own merits ... in our view the commitment to political 
co-operation is based upon, and indeed flows from the 
commitment to economic integration set out in the Treaties 
establishing the Communities ... it is hard to see how 
political co-operation can respond effectively to external 
problems unless internal cohesion and common interest within 
the Community are first of all increased and developed. "
The Irish Times of 27 October 1984 commented that the current 
Western European Union meeting took place partly because of 
Ireland's reluctance to go along with the original proposals of 
Genscher-Colombo which included regular meetings of Defence 
Ministers of EEC Member States, although Ireland was not the only 




























































































parties, clearly accept the WEU revival with some relief. It 
seemingly removes the issue of security from the forum of 
European Political Co-operation among the Ten, sparing Irish 
Ministers the embarrassement of deciding when the political 
aspects of security end, and the compromising of Irish neutrality 
begins ... "Having pointed out that this was a superficial view, 
which evaded the issue, the paper went on to say that "poli­
ticians here adopt a very jealous stance on neutrality when it is 
a matter of public debate at home, but manage to maintain 
admirable flexibility on the same topic in the context of the 
EEC ... Such discrepancies are explicable only if neutrality is 
regarded as a matter of expediency, related to circumstances, and 
not a keystone of foreign policy, permanent and non-negotiable.
Mr Cooney [the Irish Minister for Defence] had the courage and 
frankness to say so. " (19).
IRISH ATTITUDES TO INCREASED COMMUNITY POWERS
The attitudes of Irish politicians and of public opinion do not 
display the automatic objection to any increase of Community 
powers, or even to the full use of existing Community powers or 
to specific examples of Community powers such as the direct 
effect of Community law, which are conspicious in some other 
Member States. Irish people in general are not opposed to in­
creases in the powers of the Community. Only a very small mi­
nority in Ireland share the attitudes, summed up in the emotive 
word "sovereignty", which are common in Denmark and in the United 
Kingdom. It has been said (20) that "Britain, like Denmark and 
Greece, joined [the Community] not because it wanted to be in but 
because it feared to be out". Without discussing this rather 
severe statement, one can say that although Ireland certainly 
would have been unwise to stay out once the U.K. joined, Irish 
people have never felt any of the ambivalence, to put it no more 
strongly, which is felt in the U.K. about the Community. There is 
no widespread or general prejudice in Ireland against the 





























































































On the other hand, proposals to increase substantially the powers 
of the European Parliament could give rise to objections which 
have not been made so far. These objections might be based on 
instinctive reluctance to change, or to criticisms of the way in 
which the European Parliament has so far used its powers. There 
might also be objections to a large-scale transfer of powers from 
national legislatures to the Council of the Union, i.e. to 
governments. There might certainly be objections to any provision 
which created exceptions to the Commission's exclusive right to 
initiate measures since, once the veto has been ended, the 
Commission's exclusive right to initiate represents the principal 
safeguard for ensuring that the interests of smaller Member 
States will be adequately taken into account. Article 37(2) of 
the draft Treaty might therefore give rise to criticism.
IRISH NEUTRALITY
Irish neutrality has never been defined. As already mentioned, it 
is not mentioned in the Constitution. It is not the subject of 
any treaty. It has never been fully or authoritatively arti­
culated. It is therefore not easy to describe, although it has 
been the subject of a valuable book by my colleague in Trinity 
College, Dublin, Patrick Keatinge (21). In practical terms, it 
has merely meant that Ireland is not and has not been a member of 
NATO, the Western European Union, or of any military alliance. 
Apart from that, it is an attitude, and not really a policy. The 
elements which have contributed to that attitude are as follows.
The idea of Irish neutrality has been associated with indepen­
dence from Britain. The Irish people did not wish to be involved 
in "England's wars". They have a certain distrust of major 
powers. Ireland's geographical position made it possible to stay 
out of conflicts in Europe without having to maintain armed 
forces adequate to resist invasion : Irish neutrality has been 




























































































British naval bases on Irish soil, and this made possible 
Ireland's neutrality in World War II. "By 1945 the basis for a 
national tradition of neutrality, both as a value and a policy, 
had been laid" (22). After Ireland joined the U.N.. in 1955, and 
in the 1960s, the Irish government worked for disarmament 
measures and progressive withdrawal of armed forces in Europe. 
These efforts were regarded with approval in Ireland as demon­
strating an independent and constructive foreign policy, although 
Ireland's voting record in other respects in the .1). N. was not 
very different from that of other Western European countries, or 
those of the other European neutrals, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. Ireland never joined NATO. One reason suggested for this 
was that NATO member states ' commitment to respect each others' 
territories might imply recognition of the legitimacy of British 
rule in Northern Ireland. However, a stronger if less explicit 
reason is that, for geographical reasons, the Irish people do not 
feel threatened by Eastern bloc forces, and so see less need for
military preparedness than peoples further East. The feeling that 
Ireland’s neutrality is in some sense morally preferable to 
involvement in the East-West conflict or even to fnembership of a 
defensive military alliance has been strengthened by Ireland's 
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping forces, and by the view of 
Irish people that peacekeeping, neutrality, and aid to developing 
countries are related. What can best be described as insularity 
has also played a role.
Ireland applied to join the European Communities in 1961. During 
the previous two years, and subsequently, SeAn Lemass, then 
Taoiseach (prime minister) made a series of public statements to 
the effect that Ireland would involve itself in European inte­
gration wj-thout any reservations as to how far it might go in the 
areas of foreign policy and defence, and that in due course 
Ireland would cease to have a policy of neutrality. In the 
discussion before the referendum on Irish accession, in May 1972, 



























































































both- took the view that membership of the Community woulcf hot 
compromise Irish neutrality in the foreseeable future. Since the 
corresponding view was not held by Austria, Finland, Sweden or 
Switzerland, the Irish view implied (no doubt correctly) that 
Irish neutrality was different from the neutrality of those 
countries. In 1979 Jack Lynch said that Ireland had no tradi­
tional or permanent policy of neutrality, and that in the 
Community Ireland would ultimately cease to be neutral. In a 
debate in the DAil in 1981 Charles Haughey, then Taoiseach and 
leader of the same political party as his two predecessors just 
mentioned, accepted that full political union in the Community 
would ultimately involve an end of Irish neutrality. Lemass had 
probably thought more carefully about neutrality than either of 
his successors, and it is clear that he did not believe that 
neutrality should be a brake on Ireland's participation in 
European integration.
Irish neutrality therefore has been an attitude which Irish 
people have been able to take for granted, for geographical 
reasons, without analysis and virtually without economic or other 
sacrifices. (Ireland has never had compulsory military service). 
It has certainly been a less clear position than those of the 
four recognised European neutral states, Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and Switzerland. Keatinge identifies two points of view. The 
first is a "moderate" or "pragmatic" view of what national 
prosperity, security and independence make appropriate. This is 
the view of at least a majority of the two major political 
parties, and the essence of it is non-membership of any military 
alliance. This view would imply that Irish neutrality might be 
lessened or given up if other national interests or aims jus­
tified doing so. The second is a more "far-reaching" view, 
expressed by the small Labour Party (23) (which has been in 




























































































does not seem likely to achieve power alone in the foreseeable 
future) and by others, mostly outside the Oireachtas. This view 
regards neutrality as a basic, immutable, moral principle of 
national policy.
Since neutrality is highly regarded by Irish opinion, but has 
never yet conflicted with any recognised national interest or 
made necessary any significant economic sacrifices, it is
impossible to be certain which of these two views.would be closer 
to Irish public opinion after careful consideration of Irish 
accession to the proposed treaty on European Union. However, 
those who clearly advocate the second, more inflexible version of 
Irish neutrality are in general less representative of Irish 
opinion than the two major parties, though their articulate and 
indeed emotional advocacy of a more extreme concept of neutrality 
might win some public sympathy. It seems unlikely that either 
concept would ultimately prove enough to produce a majority of 
the electorate opposed to accession to a European Union. Neither 
of the major parties has had occasion to explain the reasons for 
weakening or giving up Irish neutrality for the sake of the 
economic and political advantages of participating in a European 
Union, but such an explanatory campaign by both the large 
parties, when the time comes, would certainly have a considerable 
influence on public opinion. One significant sign is that, 
although the Labour Party suggested in 1980 that neutrality 
should be written into the Constitution, there is no other 
substantial body of opinion which wishes this to be done.
However, in Ireland and elsewhere many people hope that neu­
tralist attitudes and military weakness might enable them to 
avoid being involved in any possible future conflict in Europe, 




























































































It should also be said that although the Irish like to regard 
themselves as neutral, no Irish politician ever makes the kind of 
criticisms of the USA or of other European countries which have 
often been made by Swedish politicians, or speaks as favourably 
of Communist regimes as leading Greek politicians have done.' 
Since the end of World War II hardly any action has been taken by 
any Irish government in the foreign relations sphere which would 
have caused surprise if it had been taken by, say, the Nether­
lands .
ECONOMIC ISSUES
Economic questions formed a large part of the debate in Ireland 
on accession to the Communities. They would probably be important 
in the debate on accession to the Treaty on European Union. How 
they will be considered will depend on economic developments in 
the Community and in Ireland, in particular during the period 
between now and when Ireland's accession to the European Union 
has to be decided. We do not know how long that period will be, 
or how the economies will perform during it. The economic 
advantages of joining the European Union would also have to be 
compared, presumably, with (i) remaining outside the European 
Union but inside the Community, and (ii) leaving the Community 
entirely. Neither alternative is likely to be economically 
attractive, but neither can usefully be discussed here.
Irish public opinion would obviously be more favourable to the 
European Union if the Community proves itself successful eco­
nomically in the coming years. It is impossible to isolate the 
effect of the Community on the Irish economy in 1973-1984 from 
the effects of e.g. the energy crisis, global recession, the 
Northern Ireland problem and its huge cost to the Dublin govern­
ment, and Irish economic and financial policies followed during 
the same period. However, it is clear that membership of the 




























































































in improved access to markets on the continent, higher prices for 
agricultural products, and receipts from FEOGA and the Social and 
Regional Funds. Ireland could have benefited more if its problems 
of farm structure and land use policy, and of getting more 
efficient industry and public administration, had been solved. It 
is probable that the economic advantages for Ireland of joining 
the European Union and obtaining the full economic benefits of 
membership will be strong.
IRELAND'S ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY
The Irish people would be more interested in and more favourable 
to the proposal for European Union if Ireland was playing a 
greater role in the Community. One major Irish initiative in the 
Community, if successful, would go far to convince Irish opinion 
that Ireland could make an important contribution. The kind of 
measure which would most interest Irish opinion would probably be 
the adoption of a Community policy, proposed and worked out by 
Ireland, on trade with developing countries, or of course on 
Northern Ireland. Irish attitudes on neutrality (quite apart from 
other States' views) might discourage Irish politicians from 
suggesting that the Community should take any major initiative to 
reduce international tension. Irish-inspired measures to eli­
minate barriers to intra-Community trade, if they were effective 
and far-reaching, would also help to persuade Irish opinion that 
European integration could bring important benefits. (Indeed, if 
under the present Irish presidency the negotiations for the 
accession of Spain and Portugal and for the third Lomé Convention 
can be brought to a successful conclusion, or if a useful package 
of measures on intra-Community barriers were pushed through, 
thorough coverage by the Irish media of these achievements would 





























































































peoples, the Irish tend to be exasperated with the Community not 
because it is too integrationist but because it is not moving 
fast enough, and is too often obstructed by short-sighted dis­
putes over petty issues. The Irish would be pleased by statesman­
like leadership in the Community, especially if an Irish govern­
ment had contributed to it or provided it.
THE ATTITUDES OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES
As very few considered comments have been made by Irish poli­
ticians on the draft Treaty, it is appropriate to summarise their 
attitudes to European integration generally.
Reference has been made already, in the section on Irish neutra­
lity, to statements by the three leaders of the largest political 
party in Ireland, Fianna Fail. More recently, Mr Haughey has made 
more inflexible statements, but he has never argued against the 
principle of European political integration or of Ireland's 
involvement in it, and it seems likely that his statements were 
more influenced by short-term party-political tactics than by 
long term thinking. Neutrality is popular enough in Ireland to 
tempt politicians to accuse their opponents of failure to pre­
serve it. On the other hand, Fianna Fail is more old-fashioned in 
its outlook than the other parties, and is more likely than the 
others to oppose, or at least to be ambivalent about, Ireland’s 
becoming involved in European political integration. One or two 
Fianna Fail members of the Dail have made comments more consis­
tent with the "far-reaching" version of Irish neutrality than 
with the "pragmatic" version. There is some risk that Fianna Fail 
politicians may, for short-term tactical reasons, make statements 




























































































party has previously held. There is a risk that they may do this 
without adequate awareness of the economic costs of a neutrality 
sufficient to keep Ireland out of the European Union, if their 
statements were to lead so far.
Of the three main political parties, the second largest, Fine 
Gael, now led by Dr Garret Fitzgerald, is probably the most 
favourable to European integration. That party holds the more 
moderate and more pragmatic view on neutrality identified by 
Keatinge, and Dr Fitzgerald is the most Community-minded poli­
tician in Ireland. Mr Cooney, the Minister of Defence has 
recently confirmed this attitude.
The attitude of the much smaller Labour Party is less easy to 
summarise. The Labour Party argued against accession to the 
Community in 1972, though perhaps not all its members argued with 
conviction. It loyally accepted the verdict of the 1972 refe­
rendum. In the 1980s the Labour Party published several policy 
papers (24). The paper on the European Community unreservedly 
supports the Community and Ireland's involvement in it (while 
naturally calling for more socialist policies), saying "Labour - 
... has sought, since Irish entry in 1973, to contribute fully 
and positively to the development of the institutions, policies 
and programmes of the Community, and to its overall progress." It 
adds that "Ireland's neutrality must not be compromised". The 
paper on European Political cooperation stressed "the vital 
importance of neutrality in all of this country's international 
dealings". "Creating a socialist basis for the future of the 
Community does not imply any diminution of Ireland's long­
standing neutral position". European political cooperation is a 
"threat to Irish neutrality" and Ireland should adopt "a non- 




























































































be if the Community were to ^discuss military issues, is left open, 
and the non-aligned position was undefined. The apparent impli­
cation is however that the Labour Party would be opposed to 
Ireland being involved in any developments which compromised 
Ireland's freedom to be "non-aligned". Keatinge however considers 
that since neither Fianna Fail nor Labour has repudiated the 
commitment to eventual European Union, implying involvement in 
collective defence, their real position, as distinct from their 
rhetoric, may ultimately be essentially similar to Fine Gael's.
The attitudes and uncertainties of the three main Irish political 
parties were shown at the time of the vote in the European 
Parliament on the final Spinelli Report. The Fine Gael MEPs 
voted for the Report. Of the three Labour Party MEPs, one voted 
for and two voted against. The Fianna Fàil MEPs had signed the 
register on the day of the vote but, presumably deliberately, 
were not present, and so took no position, not even abstaining.
TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS
The attitude of Irish trade unions towards Ireland's accession to 
the European Union Treaty is likely to be a result of two 
elements, the relative strength of which it is difficult to 
assess in advance. These two elements are, first, the economic 
advantages\pf joining the Union, compared with the economic 
results of not joining, and second, the extent of the feeling 
among trade unionists against joining, on political grounds 
primarily concerned with neutrality. In the short term, the 
economic consequences of joining will presumably be, in sub­
stance, simply a continuation of the existing situation within 
the Community. It is now, and may well be when thè question 
arises, very much more difficult to say what the economic 
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States of the Community, if any, which decide not to join the 
Union. Presumably these consequences would depend, in part, on 
whether their reluctance to join the Union was thought to be , 
temporary or permanent. In the case of Ireland, the economic, 
consequences of both joining and of not joining would be affected 
(though much less than in 1972) by whether the U.K. joins or not. 
Probably, as in 1972, the majority of trade union members would 
vote in accordance with their economic interests, as they saw 
them when the time comes, and the leaders of the trade union 
movement would tend to adopt the attitude adopted by the Labour 
Party, and indeed would probably largely determine that attitude.
The attitude of the employer organisations in Ireland (the 
Confederation of Irish Industries and the Federated Union of 
Employers) is almost certain to be based on their view of the 
economic results of joining or not joining, and to be unin­
fluenced by (or little influenced by) political considerations. 
They would however be more influenced t-han trade unions by the 
argument that Ireland's interests would be better protected if 
Ireland continued to have the maximum influence available to it 
in European affairs, which would imply that Ireland should join 
the Union when it comes into existence.
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
In the light of what has been said above, the probable attitude 
of public opinion and media opinion can be summarised briefly. 
The media in Ireland are mostly moderate and middle-of-the-road 
on most issues, and do not often diverge significantly from 
public opinion in general on issues relevant to the European 
Union. Of course, different newspapers, for example, represent 
different tendencies within public opinion, but all the national 
newspapers and all, or almost all, of the provincial and local 




























































































Television, which is influential, is, although State-run, not 
significantly government influenced on issues directly relevant 
to the European Union (measures have been in operation for years 
to prevent television from giving publicity to the I.R.A.). 
However, there is a minority in the media which adheres to the 
more far-reaching view of Irish neutrality, and which therefore, 
as in 1972, will be opposed to Ireland joining the European 
Union, even if the economic consequences of not joining were 
clearly unattractive. Such minorities are vocal, and the contro­
versies they arouse excite public interest and are therefore good 
media material. In 1972 what can now be seen to have been a small 
but vocal minority of anti-EEC opinion obtained a considerable 
amount of publicity, and the same viewpoint will no doubt be 
thoroughly aired (as indeed it should be, in view of the im­
portance of the issues at stake) when the occasion arises. Both 
public opinion and the media will no doubt give a great deal of 
attention to the question of neutrality, both because it has been 
a vague concept, taken for granted rather than analysed in the 
past, and because it is more likely to arouse discussion and 
controversy than the economic issues. It will by now be clear 
that the writer believes that the majority attitude to Irish 
neutrality is the "moderate" or "pragmatic" one, and that al­
though Irish public opinion supports this attitude, it is not 
likely to prevent Ireland from following what presumably will be 
its economic interests and joining the European Union.
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
For completeness, a mention should be made of the influence of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Although it is less strong 
than it was, it is still greater than in most other European 
countries. Approximately 95 % of the population of the Republic 
of Ireland are Catholics. The 1937 Constitution "recognised" the 
"special position" of the Church as that of "the great majority 
of the citizens", but this clause, which had never been con­





























































































than a statement of the obvious, was removed from the Consti­
tution, by referendum and without any opposition from the Church 
or from any significant body of opinion, several years ago. 
However, Irish Catholicism is somewhat conservative, and there 
was a majority in favour of the referendum to add a provision to 
the Constitution designed to, prevent both the legislature and the 
courts from legalising abortion.
«
It seems unlikely that the Church or Catholic opinion in Ireland 
would take any position for or against Ireland joining the 
European Union. No real view of this kind' emerged • in the dis­
cussion before the referendum in 1972 on joining the Community.
IRISH OPINION IN A REFERENDUM ON ACCESSION TO EUROPEAN UNION : 
CONCLUSION
It is not easy to foresee the circumstances most likely to lead 
governments to advocate ratification of the European Union 
Treaty. This might result from an economic crisis which only a 
more united Europe could surmount, or it might result from 
accumulated public impatience with the pettiness of national 
politicians and civil servants who are now obstructing the 
operation of the Community. Or it might result primarily from 
creative leadership from European statesmen.
Irish public opinion would almost certainly support a major 
initiative in European integration if it was led by an Irish 
politician. In the absence of such an initiative, the result of a 
referendum on Ireland's accession to a European Union would 
depend on the attitudes of the two large Irish political parties. 
Accession would be impossible unless at least one of those 
parties was in favour of it. Either, in power, would seek the 
support of the other, to obtain a bipartisan attitude, as in 
1972. If both were in favour, the referendum would almost cer­




























































































accession, the outcome would be doubtful. Much would depend, if 
the two parties disagreed, on the campaign to explain the purpose 
of the referendum and the reasons for joining the European Union. 
Of the two big parties, Fine Gael would be more likely to be in 
favour of joining, and Fianna Fail would be more likely to oppose 
it. In the Republic of Ireland, the Labour Party would certainly 
be concerned by the implications of joining for Irish neutrality, 
but it is not clear if they would go so far as to oppose joining 
if the economic arguments for it were strong, as they almost 
certainly would be. Apart from the question of neutrality,
Ireland and Irish opinion would not be as opposed to the in­
cipient federalism of the European Union as the United Kingdom 
and Denmark would probably be. Irish opinion is not sensitive 
about the Community institutions having greater powers.
Fine Gael in particular has supported majority voting in the 
Council, strengthening the Commission, and direct elections for 
the European Parliament. Fianna Fail have been less explicit, but 
by coincidence Fianna Fail have only once been in power when 
Ireland held the Presidency (and at that period were distracted 





























































































See the Irish Government publications Membership of the 
European Communities : Implications for Ireland (1970, 
Dublin) and The Accession of Ireland to the European 
Communities (1972, Dublin) of which extracts are given in 
Chubb, A Source Book of Irish Government (1983) ch. 11 ; 
Temple Lang,The Common Market and Common Law (1966) ch 3 ; 
Lynch (Then the Taorseach), The Republic of Ireland and the 
EEC - The Constitutional Position ; I; and Temple Lang, The 
Republic of Ireland and the EEC - The Constitutional 
Position : II; in Bathurst, Simmonds, Hunnings and Welch 
(eds), Legal Problems of an Enlarged European Community 
(1972) ; Temple Lang, Legal and Constitutional Implications
for Ireland of Adhesion to the EEC Treaty, 9 Common Market 
L. Rev. 167 (1972) ; Kelly, The Irish Constitution (2nd ed. , 
1984), Section on Article 29 (international relations) ; 
Murphy, The European Community and the Irish Legal System, 
in Coombes (ed. ) , Ireland and the European Communities 
(1983) pp. 29-37 ; Keatinge, Ireland and the World, in 
Litton (ed.), Unequal Achievement : the Irish Experience 
1957-1982 (1982) ; see also Hederman, The Road to Europe ;
Irish Attitudes 1948-61 (1983) ; Lyons, Ireland since the
Famine (1971) 543-551 ; Lee, Reflections on Ireland in the 
EEC (1984 ) .
The adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Ireland in 
1937 offers a precedent for at least a partial 'solution to 
the problem of establishing the Union and making it com­
patible with the Community Treaties, discussed in the paper 
by Weiler and Modrall.
The previous Irish Constitution of 1922 was adopted, 
according to Irish constitutional theory, by the Irish 
assembly or DAil which had proclaimed itself the legislature 
of an independent Irish State. In British eyes the 1922 
Constitution was conferred on the Irish Free State, with its 
dominion status, by an Act of the U.K. Parliament. The 1922 
Constitution was a compromise between Irish and British 



























































































the people of what is now the Republic of Ireland to give an 
unambiguously Irish basis to a constitution drafted wholly 
by Irishmen. See Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common 
Law, (1966), pp. 57-64. This prompts the idea that the Union 
Treaty might be the subject of a simultaneous referendum in 
all the Member States of the Community, so that the peoples 
of the entire Community could vote on the same question on 
the same day, on the basis that those States in which a 
majority of the people were in favour would join the 
European Union. This would be very democratic, and because 
the will of the people is the ultimate source of law in a 
democracy, the best possible basis for a "legal revolution".
(2) Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law (1966) pp. 40 
- 42, 46-51.
(3) Temple Lang, op. cit. 9 Common Market Law Rev. (1972) 167, 
167-168.
(4) Article 113 EEC Treaty.
(5) Case 804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom 1981 E.C.R. 1045.
(6) Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (AETR), 1971 E.C.R. 263.
(7) Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, 
O.J. No. L 17, January 26 1976.
(8) Council Declaration concerning the Convention on a European 
Community Patent. The question mentioned in the text arises 
because the Convention gives the Court of Justice power to 
interpret the Convention by a procedure similar to Article 
177 EEC Treaty : this would be incompatible with the 
Articles in the- Irish Constitution on Judicial powers unless 




























































































(9) See Temple Lang, European Community Law, Irish Law and the
Irish Legal Profession - Protection of the Individual and 
Cooperation between Member States and the Community, The 
Second Frances E. Moran Memorial Lecture, in Dublin Uni­
versity Law J. at pp. 11-18.
(10) Article 6 of the Constitution reads "All powers of govern­
ment, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under 
God, from the people ..."
(11) Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law, (1966 ) pp. 
39-40, 74-75.
(12) Article 113, EEC Treaty ; Opinion 1/75, Local Cost Standard, 
1975 E.C.R. 1355 ; Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke 1976 E.C.R.
1921 ; Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural 
Rubber 1979 E.C.R. 2871 ; Case 70/77, Simmenthal 1978 E.C.R. 
1453 .
J
(13) On the divisibility of sovereignty, see Pescatore, The Law 
of Integration (1974) 30 ; Pescatore, L'apport du droit 
communautaire au droit international public, 1970 Cahiers de 
Droit européen 501, 502-507.
(14) Temple Lang, op. cit. , 9 Common Market Law Rev. 171-176
(1972) ; Murphy, The European Community and the Irish Legal
System, in Coombes (ed.), Ireland and the European Com­
munities ( 1983) pp. 29-37, who also describes the work of 
the Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation 
of the European Communities. This Committee concerns itself 
with both Community Secondary Legislation and with Irish 
Secondary Legislation implementing Community Directives and 




























































































(15) New Ireland Forum : The Economic Consequences of the Di­
vision of Ireland since 1920 (1984) paras. 7.1-7.
(16) New Ireland Forum : A Comparative Description of the 
Economic Structure and Situation, North and South (1983) 
paras. 11.1-11.4.
(17) New Ireland Forum : The Legal Systems North and South (1984) 
Part 5.
(18) New Ireland Forum : Report (1984) para. 6.8. For a view of 
Northern Ireland by the European Parliament see the Haagerup 
Report, European Parliament Documents de Seance 1983-84,
Doc. 1-1526/83 ; see also Lyons Ireland since the Famine 
(1971) 682 et seq.
(19) See also D. Kennedy, Neutrality Stance has changed, Irish 
Times 15 November 1984 who comments that "no real attempt 
has been made to reconcile this enlarged [i.e. "far- 
reaching"] view of neutrality with the dominant thrust of 
Irish foreign policy, that is commitment to the EEC and to 
European integration . .. This poses a danger to Ireland - 
that of being relegated to the periphery of Europe moving 
towards ... a two tier Europe.
The Fianna Fail European Progressive Democrats election 
document "A strong Voice in Europe"(1984) stated that 
"Fianna Fail supports the process of European Political 
Cooperation..." but also drew a distinction between 
"security" and "military" matters, saying "it has been 
suggested that European Political Co-operation should be 
extended to military affairs. Fianna Fail is totally opposed 
to this idea. While Member States may discuss certain 
foreign policy questions touching on the political aspects 
of security, Fianna Fail is opposed to any involvement in 
either military or defence matters by Community institu­
tions. This opposition is rooted in our status as a Member 




























































































(20) International Herald Tribune, 14th July 1984, "When will 
Britain be European? "
(21) Keatinge, A Singular Stance : Irish Neutrality in the 1980s 
(1984, Dublin) ; Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 
1917-1973, (1982), ch. 6. For some comments on. the his­
torical reasons for Sweden's neutrality see The Economist, 
6-12, October 1984, Sweden : a survey.
(22) Keatinge, op. cit., p. 20.
(23) Notably in the Labour Party booklet, Ireland - a neutral 
nation (1981) .
(24) Labour Party, Ireland - a neutral nation, (1981) : The
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